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 LAW SUMMARY 
The Missouri Felony Murder Rule’s Merger 
Limitation: A Doctrine in Limbo 
JARED GUEMMER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
American criminal law is riddled with peculiarities that are decidedly 
“American” in nature.  The United States plots its own course while other 
common law countries, like England, abolish certain forms of criminal liabil-
ity1 and punishments,2 or establish mandatory protocols for criminal interro-
gations.3  Among the most prominent of America’s legal eccentricities is its 
continued use of the felony murder rule.  It casts a broad shadow over Ameri-
ca’s criminal justice system by drastically increasing the punishment for 
criminal activity that is often less culpable than other offenses not prosecuted 
under the felony murder rule.4  Many see it as a form of strict liability when a 
death results in the course of one’s felonious activities.5 
Historically, the felony murder rule was unnecessary under common law 
felonies because all felonies were punishable by death.6  As justice systems 
 
* B.A., Saint Louis University, 2013; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2016; Lead Articles Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2015–2016.  Two people 
were vital to writing this Note.  First, Elizabeth A. Guemmer, a former paralegal for 
the Missouri State Public Defender, first discovered a conflict in the law years ago 
and directed me to the issue.  Second, Carl D. Kinsky, Prosecutor for Ste. Genevieve 
County, Missouri, recognized this possible unresolved conflict in the law and con-
cluded the merger doctrine could remain viable.  Mr. Kinsky graciously provided 
suggestions, drawing from decades of criminal law experience, which were helpful 
beyond measure.  I would like to express my gratitude to them for their insight, guid-
ance, and assistance as I confronted the challenges of writing this Note. 
 1. In 1957, England eliminated the felony murder rule from its criminal justice 
system, which disparagingly called it “constructive murder.”  WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
CRIMINAL LAW 764 (4th ed. 2003). 
 2. In 1965, England abolished capital punishment for murder, and it later ended 
the use of the punishment for all crimes in 1998.  Frederick C. Millett, Will the United 
States Follow England (and the Rest of the World) in Abandoning Capital Punish-
ment?, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 547, 550 (2008). 
 3. In 1984, England mandated that all police interrogations must be electroni-
cally recorded.  Laurel LaMontagne, Children Under Pressure: The Problem of Juve-
nile False Confessions and Potential Solutions, 41 W. ST. U. L. REV. 29, 51 (2013). 
 4. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 524 (5th ed. 2009). 
 5. Compare id. at 522, with GUYORA BINDER, FELONY MURDER 23 (2012) (as-
serting that felony murder is a form of negligence liability). 
 6. LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 744 n.5. 
1
Guemmer: The Missouri Felony Murder Rule’s
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
1166 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
migrated away from that blanket form of punishment, it was important to 
recognize when a killing was a murder, and thus punishable through the 
harshest means available under the law.7  The felony murder rule developed 
as a means to effectively punish those who caused another’s death during the 
course of a felonious action.8  The rationale was that those who caused a 
death while committing a felony should face greater punishment for their 
wrongful conduct than those who commit felonies without causing a death.9 
This new rule presented a problem.  One who kills another person under 
the influence of a sudden heat of passion commits a felony: manslaughter.10  
Thus, the wrongdoer caused a death while committing a felony.11  Therefore, 
felony murder must apply.12  Under this interpretation, felony murder risks 
obliterating the crime of manslaughter because all manslaughter becomes 
punishable as felony murder.13  As a result, the felony murder rule had to be 
limited in some manner.14  The courts rapidly recognized the flaw and made 
it clear that such an absurd result could not stand: the crime of manslaughter 
would “merge” with the killing.15  For the same reasons, a lesser degree of 
murder could not serve as the felony upon which a charge of felony murder 
was predicated.16  Thus, the merger limitation of the felony murder rule was 
born, but felony murder continued to have a broad hold on punishments for 
killings other than murder. 
Imagine a circumstance where a man finds his wife in bed with another 
man.  Distraught, and unable to think clearly, he grabs a heavy object from 
the dresser and bludgeons both of them to death in the heat of passion.  Every 
first-year law student recognizes this as manslaughter.17  But, what if the 
prosecutor chooses to not charge it as manslaughter?18  What if, instead, the 
prosecutor charges the defendant with a non-killing felony, such as assault 
with a deadly weapon?19  Now, a killing occurred during the course of a felo-
ny other than manslaughter – the underlying felony is the assault, not the 
killing itself.20  Can the defendant who committed a textbook manslaughter 
 
 7. See Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 59, 64 (2004). 
 8. See id. at 94–95. 
 9. DRESSLER, supra note 4, at 524. 
 10. Id. at 528. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. People v. Rector, 19 Wend. 569, 592–93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838). 
 16. See id. at 593. 
 17. In fact, it is similar to examples provided in first-year textbooks and supple-
ments.  See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 4, at 528. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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instead be charged with murder via the felony murder rule?  In the vast ma-
jority of states, the answer is, “No.”21 
Most states, almost since the emergence of the felony murder rule, have 
limited by statute what felonies may serve as predicate – or underlying – fel-
onies.22  Some states limit the application of felony murder to those felonies 
inherently “dangerous to life,” or they limit them to an enumerated list of 
felonies.23  In many states, the merger doctrine applies to “assaultive” felo-
nies and prevents application of the felony murder rule to killings that occur 
in the course of an assaultive felony.24  The merger doctrine requires the actor 
have an independent, felonious purpose, other than causing bodily harm or 
death to the victim.25 
Unfortunately, recent case law in Missouri obliterated the merger doc-
trine.26  This Note aims to expose the faulty reasoning applied by Missouri 
courts in abrogating the merger doctrine.  In Part II, this Note will summarize 
the history of the merger doctrine, both generally and in Missouri.  Then, Part 
III highlights the recent developments in Missouri law regarding felony mur-
der and the merger doctrine.  In Part IV, this Note discusses the purpose of 
the merger doctrine, the rules of interpretation regarding Missouri’s felony 
murder provision, and why Missouri courts incorrectly decided the merger 
doctrine no longer functions as a valid legal theory in Missouri.  Finally, Part 
V concludes this Note with a short discussion about the future of the merger 
doctrine and the role the Supreme Court of Missouri must play in that future. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 The merger doctrine was recognized even before the founding of our 
nation.27  In America, it first developed in New York,28 and Missouri fol-
lowed only a few decades later.29  This Part will discuss the merger doctrine’s 
development, which gives context to the role of the merger doctrine in our 
criminal justice system. 
 
 21. Id. at 527–28. 
 22. LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 744. 
 23. Id. 
 24. DRESSLER, supra note 4, at 528–29. 
 25. People v. Rector, 19 Wend. 569, 592–93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838); BINDER, 
supra note 5, at 164. 
 26. See infra Part III. 
 27. BINDER, supra note 5, at 231. 
 28. Id. at 232. 
 29. Id. 
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A.  Historical Development of the Merger Doctrine 
One commentator noted that “[t]he merger problem was recognized as 
soon as felony murder rules were first proposed.”30  In 1716, more than one 
hundred years before New York established the first merger limitation in the 
United States,31 William Hawkins wrote that a killing committed in the 
course of a felony was murder only if it occurred during “the execution of an 
unlawful action principally intended for some other purpose, and not to do a 
personal injury to [the victim] who happens to be slain.”32  Though not bind-
ing, the history of New York’s merger doctrine is useful in understanding the 
significance of the doctrine.  New York was the first state to establish the 
limitation, and its reasoning reflects many of the core principles and exposes 
the absurdities of a criminal justice system without a merger limitation. 
In 1838, New York courts recognized the first merger limitation on fel-
ony murder in the United States.33  At the time, New York statutory law dic-
tated that an unlawful killing was murder if it was “perpetrated without any 
design to effect death, by a person engaged in the commission of any felo-
ny.”34  New York adopted the merger limitation in People v. Rector,35 where 
the court held that the underlying – or “predicate” – felony must have a pur-
pose independent of the victim’s death or serious injury.36  The facts of that 
case showed the killing to be, by statutory definition, manslaughter.37  The 
New York court rejected the contention that manslaughter could act as the 
predicate felony for a felony murder charge.38  Without such a limitation in 
place, manslaughter would cease to exist because it is a felony from which a 
killing results – “ergo it is murder.”39  The court refused to allow this absurd 
result.40 
In 1872, New York implicitly extended the  merger limitation to feloni-
ous assaults41 but explicitly rejected the application of a merger limitation to 
 
 30. Id. at 231. 
 31. Id. at 232. 
 32. Id. at 231 (quoting WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE 
CROWN 83 (1716)). 
 33. Id. at 232. 
 34. Id. at 163 (emphasis added) (quoting N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 1, § 5 
(1829)). 
 35. 19 Wend. 569, 592–93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838); BINDER, supra note 5, at 164. 
 36. BINDER, supra note 5, at 164. 
 37. Rector, 19 Wend. at 592–93.  The defendant struck the victim with a single 
blow, which was not fatal in itself.  Id. at 592.  Thus, the attack was a misdemeanor.  
Id.  The attack ultimately resulted in death.  Id. at 571.  By statute, a killing that oc-
curred in the course of a misdemeanor was manslaughter.  Id. at 592. 
 38. Id. 
 39. BINDER, supra note 5, at 164 (quoting Rector, 19 Wend. at 593). 
 40. Rector, 19 Wend. at 593. 
 41. Foster v. People, 50 N.Y. 598 (N.Y. 1872), accord People v. Huter, 184 N.Y. 
237, 243–44 (N.Y. 1906); BINDER, supra note 5, at 232.  In Foster, the court noted 
4
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rape in 1879.42  In 1906, the Court of Appeals of New York made explicit 
what it implied in 1872.  It held that assaultive felonies merge into the result-
ing homicide43 when it overturned the murder conviction of a defendant who 
resisted an officer’s lawful arrest and the officer died as a result of that re-
sistance.44  The court held that violence may be part of the underlying felony, 
but the “other elements constituting the felony in which [the defendant was] 
engaged must be so distinct from that of the homicide as not to be an ingredi-
ent of the homicide.”45   Crimes that did not meet this standard merged with 
the homicide and could not support a felony murder charge.46  The New York 
court notably added that the act causing the death need not be separate from 
the act performed in committing the underlying felony, stating that “if the act 
causing the death be committed with a collateral and independent felonious 
design it is sufficient.”47  Thus, in order for a felony to underlie a felony mur-
der charge, the elements of the underlying felony must provide a “purpose 
independent of the homicide.”48 
To summarize, New York concluded that manslaughter may not act as 
the underlying felony in Rector49 and, in Huter, that an assaultive felony may 
not act as the underlying felony when that felony’s sole purpose is to inflict 
harm or death upon the victim.50  In felony murder cases, a felony could serve 
as the underlying felony only if it was committed with a “felonious design” 
that was independent of the intent to assault the victim.51  For example, rape 
does not merge with a homicide because it has a motive beyond inflicting 
harm.52  These principles are key to understanding the merger doctrine, and 
understanding them begins to shed light regarding why the merger doctrine 
 
that the defendant committed a felonious assault if he struck the victim with the intent 
of inflicting personal injury but without the intent of killing him.  50 N.Y. at 602.  
The defendant was charged with first-degree murder for striking a man upon the head 
with intent to kill.  Id. at 604.  The defendant sought an instruction for second-degree 
murder, claiming that his actions constituted a felony – assault and battery with intent 
to maim, but without intent to kill – during which a killing occurred.  Id. at 600.  The 
court refused the defendant’s position, holding that such a felony merged with the 
killing and no instruction should be granted.  Id. at 609. 
 42. Buel v. People, 78 N.Y. 492, 497 (N.Y. 1879); BINDER, supra note 5, at 232.  
In Buel, the defendant argued that rape was not “separate and distinct” from the kill-
ing.  78 N.Y. at 494. 
 43. Huter, 184 N.Y. at 243 (noting that “whether the felony in which [the de-
fendant] was engaged at the time of the killing is merged” with the killing was a 
“much mooted question”). 
 44. Id. at 244. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.; BINDER, supra note 5, at 232. 
 48. BINDER, supra note 5, at 232. 
 49. People v. Rector, 19 Wend. 569, 593 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838). 
 50. Huter, 184 N.Y. at 244. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Buel v. People, 78 N.Y. 492, 497 (N.Y. 1879). 
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plays an important role in ensuring that defendants are punished in accord-
ance with their culpability. 
B.  Development of the Merger Doctrine in Missouri 
Missouri was among the earliest adopters of the merger limitation in 
felony murder cases.53  In 1845, Missouri’s murder statute adopted language 
that aggravated second-degree murder to murder in the first degree if it was 
committed in the attempt of any felony.54  Technically speaking, this was not 
a true felony murder statute.  This statute merely aggravated a murder from 
second degree to first degree if the murder was committed in the course of 
another felony. 55  It did not establish any killing in the course of a felony as 
murder.56  This distinction should not lead to confusion: the merger limitation 
analysis applies just the same. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri applied this aggravating statute in a 
handful of cases.57  In an 1853 case, State v. Jennings, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri approved a jury instruction stating: “If . . . it was not the intention of 
those concerned in lynching [the victim] to kill him, but that they did intend 
to do him great bodily harm, and that in so doing death ensued, such killing is 
murder in the first degree, by the statute of this State.”58  Four years later, the 
court approved a similar jury instruction in State v. Nueslein.59  The Supreme 
Court of Missouri later went on to say that any killing in the course of a felo-
ny was murder.60  Thus, a true felony murder rule was born. 
 
 53. See id. 
 54. Id. at 165.  This statute adopted a modified version of the Pennsylvania mur-
der statute.  Id.  The Pennsylvania statute aggravated murder to first-degree murder if 
the murder occurred in the course of attempting an enumerated felony.  Id. 
 55. State v. Shock, 68 Mo. 552, 559 (1878) (quoting WAG. STAT. (1872) c. 42, 
art. 2, § 1, p.445) (“Every murder which shall be committed by means of poison, or 
by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, 
or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, 
rape, robbery, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed murder in the first degree.”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See BINDER, supra note 5, at 166–67. 
 58. 18 Mo. 435, 441, 444 (1853), overruled by Shock, 68 Mo. 552.  Inflicting 
“great bodily harm” on another was deemed to be a crime for which the punishment 
was imprisonment.  Id. at 444.  Thus, it was a felony.  Id. 
 59. 25 Mo. 111, 121 (1857), overruled by Shock, 68 Mo. 552.  (“If you believe 
that defendant . . . did willfully strike and wound deceased as described . . . and that 
he did so without the specific intent to kill her, but with the intent to inflict upon her 
great bodily harm, and deceased came to her death by wounds inflicted under such 
circumstances, then defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree . . . .”). 
 60. State v. Weiners, 66 Mo. 13, 22 (1877) (“If one in perpetrating or attempting 
to perpetrate a felony, kill a human being, such killing is murder, although not specif-
ically intended, for the law attaches the intent to commit the other felony to the homi-
cide.  The law conclusively presumes the intent to kill.”). 
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In 1878, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed course in State v. 
Shock and held that assaultive felonies merged into a homicide and could not 
underlie a felony murder charge.61  Shock was a child abuse case.62  The de-
fendant beat a young child with a fishing pole, went outside, obtained a 
grapevine, and used the vine to beat the child.63  The child died several days 
later.64 
The trial court gave the following jury instruction regarding murder in 
the first degree: “To constitute murder in the first degree, it is not necessary 
that the fatal beating, wounding or striking be given with the specific intent to 
kill; it is sufficient if it be given willfully and maliciously, and with the intent 
to inflict great bodily harm, and death ensue.”65 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected the trial court’s jury 
instruction regarding murder in the first degree.66  The court closely exam-
ined the statute, which in relevant part said: “Every murder . . . which shall be 
committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, rob-
bery, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed murder in the first degree.”67  
In examining the meaning of the statute, and the term “other felony,” the 
court recognized the same absurd result the New York courts saw thirty years 
earlier – allowing any felony to act as the predicate felony for a felony mur-
der conviction would permit charging murder for those killings that constitute 
manslaughter.68  Therefore, the Supreme Court of Missouri announced a new 
rule: 
We are of the opinion that the words “other felony” used in [the stat-
ute] refer to some collateral felony, and not to those acts of personal 
violence to the deceased which are necessary and constituent elements 
of the homicide itself, and are, therefore, merged in it, and which do 
not, when consummated, constitute an offense distinct from the homi-
cide.69 
 
 61. 68 Mo. 552; see also BINDER, supra note 5, at 166–67. 
 62. Shock, 68 Mo. at 557. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 558.  The trial court also gave the following instruction, as to a finding 
of guilt: “If the jury believes, from the evidence, that it was not the intention of the 
defendant to kill the child . . . by whipping him, but that he did intend to do him great 
bodily harm, and in so whipping him, death ensued, he is guilty of murder in the first 
degree.”  Id. 
 66. Id. at 561–62. 
 67. Id. at 559 (emphasis added) (quoting WAG. STAT. (1872) c. 42, art. 2, § 1, 
p.445). 
 68. See id. at 561. 
 69. Id. at 561–62 (citing FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF HOMICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 55, 56, 57, 58, 62 (1855)). 
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In Shock, the court utilized its prior reasoning in a misdemeanor man-
slaughter70 case that the underlying misdemeanor must be “some other mis-
demeanor than that which is an ingredient in the imputed offense . . . where 
an act becomes criminal from the perpetration or the attempt to perpetrate 
some other crime, it would seem that the lesser could not be a part of the 
greater offense.”71  In essence, the Shock court held that an assault, being an 
act of personal violence against the deceased that is necessary in order to 
effect the homicide, merges with the homicide and is not a distinct offense 
from the homicide.72  Thus, the assault cannot serve as a felony that aggra-
vates a killing to first-degree murder.  In so holding, the court in Shock ex-
plicitly overruled both Jennings and Nueslein.73  Shortly after the decision in 
Shock, the Missouri legislature amended the murder statute by explicitly lim-
iting predicate felonies to a short list of enumerated felonies.74 
Throughout the more than one hundred years following the decision in 
Shock, very little was said in Missouri regarding the merger doctrine.  The 
Supreme Court of Missouri has not directly addressed the validity of the mer-
ger doctrine since that case.75  More recently, the Missouri Court of Appeals 
indicated its belief that the merger doctrine has been statutorily abrogated.76 
III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The Missouri criminal code was heavily revised in 1979.77  In the fol-
lowing years, felony murder in the first degree and its enumerated predicate 
felonies were repealed.78  Felony murder continued to exist in the second-
degree murder statute.79  The murder statutes currently in effect remain iden-
tical.80 
Missouri Revised Statutes Section 565.021.1(1) states: “A person com-
mits the crime of murder in the second degree if he [k]nowingly causes the 
 
 70. Misdemeanor manslaughter is a concept fundamentally similar to felony 
murder.  See JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
CRIMINAL LAW 336 (2012).  One who causes a death in the course of committing a 
misdemeanor may be charged with manslaughter.  Id. 
 71. Shock, 68 Mo. at 563 (citing State v. Sloan, 47 Mo. 604 (1871)). 
 72. Id. at 561–62. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Guyora Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder, 91 B.U. L. REV. 403, 
528–29 (2011).  “Every murder . . . which shall be committed in the perpetration or 
attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or mayhem, shall be deemed 
murder in the first degree.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 1232 (1879). 
 75. See BINDER, supra note 5, at 167. 
 76. See Part III.A–C. 
 77. Joseph J. Simeone, Duty, Power, and Limits of Police Use of Deadly Force 
in Missouri, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 123, 166 (2002). 
 78. See MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020 (1986). 
 79. See id. § 565.021. 
 80. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 565.020–.021 (2000). 
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death of another person or, with the purpose of causing serious physical inju-
ry to another person, causes the death of another person.”81  Subsection 2 
states that the defendant is guilty of second-degree murder if he “[c]ommits 
or attempts to commit any felony, and . . . another person is killed as a re-
sult.”82  Additionally, Section 565.021.2 states: “Murder in the second degree 
is a class A felony, and the punishment for second degree murder shall be in 
addition to the punishment for commission of a related felony or attempted 
felony, other than murder or manslaughter.”83 
The Supreme Court of Missouri has been silent regarding the merger 
doctrine for over one hundred years.84  More recently, however, the Missouri 
Court of Appeals has addressed the issue.  In 1987, the Missouri Court of 
Appeals for the Eastern District noted the application of the merger limita-
tion.85  Since then, the tide of court decisions has pushed back against the 
merger limitation.86  Most notably, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the 
Western District completely abrogated the merger limitation. 
   
 
 81. Id. § 565.021.1(1).  This particular subsection is key to the later analysis of 
this issue.  That is because this provision enumerates a specific felony that may un-
derlie a felony murder charge – acting “with the purpose of causing serious physical 
injury to another person.”  Id.  The enumerated felony is Section 565.050: assault in 
the first degree.  Id. § 565.050. 
 82. Id. § 565.021.1(2).  In Bouser, the Western District Court of Appeals relied 
on this “any felony” language to claim abrogation of the merger limitation.  See infra 
Part III.A. 
 83. § 565.021.2 (emphasis added). 
 84. No cases address the validity or invalidity of a merger doctrine.  Reference to 
the “merging” of crimes is made in a handful of cases, but those references were 
made in the context of double jeopardy arguments.  See State v. Overstreet, 551 
S.W.2d 621, 630 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); see also State v. Chambers, 524 S.W.2d 826, 
831 (Mo. 1975) (en banc).  The defendant in Overstreet claimed “merger” occurred 
between a charge of robbery and felony murder, and that he could not be charged with 
both without being subjected to multiple punishments for a single offense.  Over-
street, 551 S.W.2d at 630.  This is a clear reference to the concept of lesser included 
offenses under the Blockburger double jeopardy analysis and has nothing to do with 
the felony murder merger limitation.  See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 
304 (1932). 
 85. State v. Hanes, 729 S.W.2d 612, 617 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (“The felony-
murder doctrine does not apply where the felony is an offense included in the charge 
of homicide.  The acts of assault merge into the resultant homicide, and may not be 
deemed a separate and independent offense which could support an instruction for 
felony murder.”). 
 86. See, e.g., State v. Simino, 397 S.W.3d 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); State v. Gray, 
347 S.W.3d 490 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Gheen, 41 S.W.3d 598 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2001); State v. Williams, 24 S.W.3d 101 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Bouser, 17 
S.W.3d 130 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Rogers, 976 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1998). 
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A.  The Western District 
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District is Missouri’s 
leader in the push to eliminate the merger limitation.  In 2000, its decisions 
explicitly announced a statutory abrogation of the merger limitation,87 and it 
has stuck to that decision ever since.88 
The first indication of reluctance within the Western District to continue 
to apply the merger limitation arose in 1998.89  In State v. Rogers, Rogers was 
charged with felony murder.90  The underlying felony was Unlawful Use of a 
Weapon under Missouri Revised Statutes Section 571.030.1(4).91  Rogers 
fired a gun into the air to “scare” a crowd of people across the street.92  Rog-
ers then pointed the gun at the ground as a woman from the crowd ap-
proached.93  She told Rogers that he “didn’t have the balls to shoot that 
gun.”94  Rogers fired the gun toward the ground in front of him, but the bullet 
ricocheted and struck the woman in the chest.95  She later died from her inju-
ries.96 
Rogers argued the unlawful use of a weapon charge merged into the 
killing and thus could not underlie a felony murder conviction.97  Rogers re-
lied on a case from 1977, State v. Cook, which held that the felony of Unlaw-
ful Use of a Weapon merged into the killing when a defendant began bran-
dishing a firearm out of the window of his car, and it discharged and killed 
the victim.98 
The Rogers court distinguished Rogers from Cook by holding that the 
initial shot fired into the air was the underlying felony and that it did not 
merge with the killing because it was a separate and distinguishable act.99  
The Rogers court did not hold that merger ceased to be a valid limitation, but 
instead stated that the merger limitation would govern if the only shot fired 
were the killing shot.100  However, because two shots were fired, one that 
 
 87. Williams, 24 S.W.3d at 117. 
 88. See Gheen, 41 S.W.3d at 605. 
 89. See Rogers, 976 S.W.2d 529. 
 90. Id. at 530. 
 91. Id.  Under Section 571.030.1(4), “A person commits the crime of unlawful 
use of weapons if he or she knowingly . . . [e]xhibits, in the presence of one or more 
persons, any weapon readily capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening manner . 
. . .”  MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.030.1(4) (West 2015). 
 92. Rogers, 976 S.W.2d at 531. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (citing State v. Cook, 560 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977), abroga-
tion recognized by State v. Dudley, 303 S.W.3d 203, 207 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010)). 
 99. Id. at 532. 
 100. Id. 
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merged with the killing and one that did not, the shot that did not merge could 
underlie the felony murder conviction.101 
In the words of Professor Guyora Binder, the Rogers court’s rationale 
was “almost comically strained.”102  The Rogers rationale fails completely, 
and it demonstrates the court’s desire to evade the merger limitation at almost 
any cost.  The felony with which Rogers was charged involved “exhibiting,” 
or brandishing, the firearm; firing the gun had nothing to do with the felo-
ny.103  Rogers could have fired ten shots, and he would still have committed 
only one felony under Section 571.030.1(4).  This would be a different dis-
cussion if Rogers had been charged under a different provision within the 
unlawful use of a weapon statute – one that tied the crime to the firing of the 
gun.104  However, that was not the case.  Thus, the merger limitation should 
have been applied under the Cook rationale and overturned the felony murder 
conviction. 
Over the next three years, the Western District issued decisions an-
nouncing the statutory abrogation of the merger doctrine.105  In State v. 
Bouser, the Western District began dismantling the merger limitation.106  It 
did so in two stages: first, it attacked the applicability of Shock to modern 
felony murder interpretation on the basis that Shock interpreted a law drasti-
cally different from the modern felony murder formulation.107  Second, it 
considered the modern legislative intent regarding the statutory language 
utilized in the current felony murder provision within the second-degree mur-
der statute.108 
Regarding Shock’s continued applicability, the Bouser court said: “The 
Shock court’s analysis was conducted within a much different legal context 
and interpreted very different criminal statutes than exist today and accord-
ingly is of little value in our case.”109  One aspect of the Bouser analysis em-
phasized that the felony murder provision in Shock differentiated between a 
“homicide” and a “murder.”110  It focused on the notion that the felony mur-
der provision in Shock only aggravated those killings that constituted “mur-
 
 101. Id. 
 102. BINDER, supra note 5, at 238. 
 103. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.030.1(4) (West 2015) (“A person commits the 
crime of unlawful use of weapons if he or she knowingly . . . [e]xhibits, in the pres-
ence of one or more persons, any weapon readily capable of lethal use in an angry or 
threatening manner . . . .”). 
 104. See, e.g., id. § 571.030.1(3). 
 105. See, e.g., State v. Gheen, 41 S.W.3d 598 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Wil-
liams, 24 S.W.3d 101 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Bouser, 17 S.W.3d 130 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1999). 
 106. 17 S.W.3d 130. 
 107. Id. at 136–37. 
 108. Id. at 138–40. 
 109. Id. at 136. 
 110. Id. (citing State v. Shock, 68 Mo. 552, 559–60 (1878)). 
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der.”111  Additionally, Bouser noted a 1983 Supreme Court of Missouri case 
that discussed the operation of the second-degree felony murder provision in 
effect at the time – a statute that remained unchanged since 1835 – and the 
fact that the Supreme Court of Missouri did not note a merger limitation for 
second-degree felony murder.112  Because Shock only considered the first-
degree felony murder provision, it considered Clark to be the authority on 
second-degree felony murder,113 and, because it made no mention of the mer-
ger limitation, it concluded that there was no such limitation for second-
degree felony murder.114 
The Bouser court then turned to the legislature’s intent in formulating 
the modern second-degree murder statute, which includes the felony murder 
provision.115  It noted that Clark made no mention of a merger limitation and 
that the statute does not enumerate a list of potential underlying felonies.116  
Further, the Bouser court took special note of, and ultimately relied on, the 
fact that the felony murder provision uses the words “any felony” in reference 
to a killing that occurs during the commission of a felony.117  The Bouser 
court held that this modification in statutory language, combined with the 
elimination of first-degree felony murder, indicated the legislature’s intent to 
eradicate limitations on felony murder, and thus any felony, even one assaul-
tive in nature, could underlie a felony murder conviction.118 
 
 111. Id. (citing Shock, 68 Mo. at 559–60).  It should be noted that Shock was not 
analyzing a pure felony murder statute, but a statute that aggravated second-degree 
murder to first-degree murder.  See id. at 135 (quoting WAG. STAT. (1872) c. 42, art. 
2, § 1, p.445) (“Every murder which shall be committed by means of poison, or by 
lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or 
which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, 
robbery, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed murder in the first degree.”). 
 112. Id. (citing State v. Clark, 652 S.W.2d 123, 127 (Mo. 1983) (en banc)) (stating 
that “homicides committed in the perpetration of . . . any felony other than the five 
listed in the first[-]degree murder statute” could underlie a second-degree felony mur-
der conviction).  The statute in effect at the time stated: “All other kinds of murder at 
common law, not herein declared to be manslaughter or justifiable or excusable hom-
icide, shall be deemed murder in the second degree.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 565.004 
(1978).  The first-degree murder statute enumerated the five felonies that would un-
derlie a first-degree felony murder charge.  Id. § 565.003 (“Any person who unlawful-
ly kills another human being without a premeditated intent to cause the death of a 
particular individual is guilty of the offense of first[-]degree murder if the killing was 
committed in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, 
burglary or kidnapping.”). 
 113. Bouser, 17 S.W.3d at 136 (citing Clark, 652 S.W.2d at 127). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 138. 
 116. Id. at 136, 138. 
 117. Id. at 138–39. 
 118. Id. at 140. 
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In State v. Williams, the Western District modified its rationale and de-
parted from Bouser.119  Williams is interesting because Williams and Bouser 
were decided only five months apart, yet Williams made no reference to 
Bouser.120  Additionally, Williams essentially rejected the Bouser court’s 
rationale that the language “any felony” eliminated the merger limitation.121 
The Williams court was more methodical than Bouser.  Additionally, it 
showed a greater degree of deference to Shock in that it saw no difference 
between the statute interpreted by Shock and the modern second-degree mur-
der statute which utilized the language “any felony.”122  It noted that other, 
more recent cases, including Clark,123 Cook,124 Hanes,125 and Rogers,126 all 
relied on an understanding of second-degree felony murder that permitted any 
felony to underlie the felony murder conviction, but that felony murder was 
nonetheless limited by the merger doctrine announced in Shock.127  Thus, the 
Williams court concluded that the addition of the language “any felony” to 
Section 565.021.1(2) could not be the source of the abrogation of the merger 
doctrine, because the legislature merely continued to use language understood 
by the courts for over a century to be limited by the merger doctrine.128 
Instead, the Williams court turned to Section 565.021.2 for the language 
it claimed abrogates the merger limitation for felony murder.129  That section 
states: “Murder in the second degree is a class A felony, and the punishment 
for second degree murder shall be in addition to the punishment for commis-
sion of a related felony or attempted felony, other than murder or manslaugh-
 
 119. State v. Williams, 24 S.W.3d 101, 116–17 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). 
 120. See Bouser, 17 S.W.3d 130; Williams, 24 S.W.3d 101. 
 121. Williams, 24 S.W.3d at 116. 
 122. Id. at 115–16.  The Williams court concluded that the statute at issue in Shock 
extended felony murder to “any felony” because it did not expressly exclude any 
felonies.  See id. 
 123. State v. Clark, 652 S.W.2d 123, 127 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (stating that 
“homicides committed in the perpetration of . . . any felony other than the five listed 
in the first[-]degree murder statute” could underlie a second-degree felony murder 
conviction). 
 124. State v. Cook, 560 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (holding the mer-
ger doctrine precluded a second-degree felony murder conviction when the underly-
ing felony was unlawful use of a weapon that discharged and killed the victim), abro-
gation recognized by State v. Dudley, 303 S.W.3d 203, 207 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 125. State v. Hanes, 729 S.W.2d 612, 617 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (“The felony-
murder doctrine does not apply where the felony is an offense included in the charge 
of homicide.  The acts of assault merge into the resultant homicide, and may not be 
deemed a separate and independent offense which could support an instruction for 
felony murder.”). 
 126. State v. Rogers, 976 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the mer-
ger doctrine precluded the second, killing, shot from serving as the underlying felony 
of a felony murder conviction). 
 127. Williams, 24 S.W.3d at 115. 
 128. Id. at 116. 
 129. Id. at 117. 
13
Guemmer: The Missouri Felony Murder Rule’s
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
1178 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
ter.”130  The Williams court interpreted this provision to mean that the legisla-
ture intended to exclude the felonies of murder and manslaughter from acting 
as the underlying felonies for felony murder.131  Further, the Williams court 
said this exclusion served to fulfill one of the primary purposes of the merger 
limitation – preventing felony murder from “swallowing up” murder and 
manslaughter and the gradations of those crimes.132 
The Williams court then turned to whether the legislature intended to 
exclude felonies other than murder and manslaughter from serving as under-
lying felonies for felony murder.133  Applying the maxim expressio unius est 
exclusion alterius – “the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of anoth-
er thing”134 – the Williams court concluded that the explicit statutory lan-
guage excluding murder and manslaughter from serving as underlying felo-
nies thereby prevented the courts from reading further exclusions into the 
statute.135  Thus, the merger limitation was abrogated, and truly any felony, 
except murder and manslaughter, could serve as an underlying felony for a 
felony murder conviction. 
One year later, in State v. Gheen, the Western District put the final nail 
in the merger doctrine’s coffin: “Applying this court’s decisions in both 
Bouser and Williams, we hold that the merger doctrine, under the current 
Missouri statutory scheme, is no longer a viable theory.”136 More recently, 
the Eastern and Southern Districts have looked to the Western District to 
analyze the continuing validity of the merger doctrine. 
B.  The Eastern and Southern Districts 
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District has not explicitly 
ruled on the validity of the merger doctrine since the Western District decided 
Bouser and Williams.  In 2011, the Eastern District made its only reference to 
the issue in State v. Gray.137  The Eastern District simply noted that “modern 
precedent suggests that the merger doctrine has been abrogated” and cited 
Williams for this proposition.138  However, the court briefly entertained the 
idea that the merger doctrine remained viable, but it ultimately stated that it 
would be inapplicable to the facts of the case: “Assuming arguendo that the 
merger doctrine is still viable, it is not applicable to the case sub judice.”139 
 
 130. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 565.021.2 (2000)). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Kan. City v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 87 S.W.2d 195, 205 (Mo. 1935) 
(citation omitted). 
 135. Williams, 24 S.W.3d at 117. 
 136. 41 S.W.3d 598, 605 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). 
 137. 347 S.W.3d 490 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011). 
 138. Id. at 508 (citing Williams, 24 S.W.3d at 117). 
 139. Id.  The defendant in Gray was convicted under 565.021.1(1) and was not 
convicted under the traditional felony murder provision.  Id. 
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The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District has decided on-
ly a single case regarding the merger doctrine’s validity since Williams, but it 
expressed its views far more explicitly than the Eastern District.140  In State v. 
Simino, the Southern District adopted the Western District’s reasoning in 
Williams and held that “[t]he express language of the felony-murder statute 
abrogated the common law doctrine of merger.”141 
It is unfortunate that the Eastern and Southern Districts did not consider 
the issue to a greater degree.  The Western District’s rationale for abrogation 
remains unchallenged in the Missouri Court of Appeals, and the Supreme 
Court of Missouri has not granted transfer to any case to rule on the issue 
itself.  The issue now remains uncertain.  One commentator has noted that “it 
is unclear whether or not Missouri retains a merger doctrine.”142 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
This Note’s objective is to closely examine the merger doctrine and de-
termine whether it remains a legally viable doctrine in Missouri.  Toward that 
end, this Part will first discuss the purpose of a merger limitation on felony 
murder.  It will demonstrate the dangers posed to society that are present 
when the applicability of felony murder is left to the whims of prosecutors.  
This Part will then consider the rules of statutory interpretation that are rele-
vant to this examination.  Finally, this Part will address the rationales utilized 
by the Western District Court of Appeals.  Ultimately, it will discuss how the 
statutes should be interpreted in light of the rules of statutory interpretation 
and the language of the relevant provisions. 
A.  The Purpose of the Merger Limitation 
Felony murder is a reviled principle of American law.143  Scholars al-
most unanimously denounce it as morally indefensible.144  It has been said 
that “[p]rincipled argument in favor of the felony-murder doctrine is hard to 
find,”145 and that “[c]riticism of the rule constitutes a lexicon of everything 
that scholars and jurists can find wrong with a legal doctrine.”146  It authoriz-
es punishment for an accidental death equal to that of a planned killing.147 
 
 140. See State v. Simino, 397 S.W.3d 11, 24–25 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013), abrogated 
on other grounds by State v. Sisco, 458 S.W.3d 304, 311 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 141. Id. at 25. 
 142. BINDER, supra note 5, at 238. 
 143. See id. at 3. 
 144. Id. 
 145. DRESSLER, supra note 4, at 558 (quoting AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Com-
ment to § 210.2, at 37). 
 146. Id. (quoting Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A 
Doctrine of Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORN. L. REV. 446, 446 (1985)). 
 147. Id. at 557 & n.108. 
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This revulsion, directed at a barbaric and arcane form of assigning 
blame, led courts and scholars to find ways to limit its application and make it 
more palatable.148  Early felony murder statutes often limited felony murder 
by enumerating the felonies permitted to serve as predicates for felony mur-
der, which explains why so few cases in the nineteenth century addressed the 
issue of the merger limitation.149  However, those states that codified a felony 
murder provision without limits suffered from the “merger problem.”150 
The merger problem has two forms.  The first is that lesser degrees of 
homicide are felonies in themselves.151  In those cases, a felony is committed 
and a killing results in the course of its commission.152  Without a merger 
limitation, the State can charge a defendant with felony murder, with the un-
derlying felony being involuntary manslaughter.153  Such a rule would bypass 
the legislature’s and society’s beliefs that certain types of killings should be 
punished differently.154  Thus, one necessary merger limitation is intended to 
prevent the use of lesser forms of homicide as the predicate felony for a felo-
ny murder charge.155 
The second form seeks to bypass the first merger limitation.  Imagine 
that A is roused to anger by B on the street because B made a profane com-
ment about A’s girlfriend.  A lashes out with a single punch to B’s head.  B 
strikes his head on concrete and dies.  At worst, A committed voluntary man-
slaughter.156  However, it is more likely that A committed involuntary man-
slaughter.157  Assume that manslaughter is not permitted to act as the predi-
cate felony for felony murder.  The State may bypass this limitation by charg-
ing A with assault in the second degree;158 this then serves as the predicate 
felony for felony murder.  Now, the felonious assault serves to turn what 
should be an involuntary manslaughter conviction, which may be punished by 
up to four years imprisonment, into a felony murder conviction, which is 
punishable by ten to thirty years or life imprisonment.159 
 
 148. BINDER, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
 149. Id. at 232. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 227. 
 152. See id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See id. 
 156. A person commits voluntary manslaughter by causing the death of another 
person “with the purpose of causing serious physical injury” while acting under the 
influence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause.  MO. REV. STAT. § 
565.023.1(1) (2000). 
 157. A person commits involuntary manslaughter by “[r]ecklessly caus[ing] the 
death of another person.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 565.024.1(1) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 158. The State could charge A with assault in the second degree because he “reck-
lessly cause[d] serious physical injury to another person.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 
565.052.1(3) (2000). 
 159. See id. §§ 565.021, .024, 558.011. 
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To make matters worse for A, the felony murder rule in this situation 
eases the State’s burden of proof.160  In order to prove that A committed felo-
ny murder, the State must merely prove that A recklessly caused serious phys-
ical injury to B – the underlying felony – and that B died as a result of A 
committing the underlying felony.161  The State can obtain a thirty-year or life 
sentence by barely lifting a finger, whereas normally it would be required to 
prove intent to kill without the influence of sudden passion.162 
The merger doctrine prohibits these results.  The merger doctrine re-
quires there be some felonious intent or purpose that is separate and distin-
guishable from the act of causing physical injury or death.163  If the killing 
and the felony are indistinguishable from one another, except insofar as a 
death occurred, then the felony merges into the killing and cannot serve as an 
underlying felony for felony murder.164 
For example, if a young man punches another in the head, and the vic-
tim dies after his head strikes the ground, the felonious assault and killing are 
indistinguishable from one another.165  There was no independent felonious 
intent or purpose other than to cause physical injury or death.166  Thus, if the 
defendant was acting coolly and rationally, and intended the victim’s death, 
he may be charged with conventional murder.167  If the defendant acted under 
the influence of sudden passion, he may be charged with voluntary man-
slaughter.168  If he did not intend the victim’s death, but did intend to cause 
physical injury, he may be charged with involuntary manslaughter or some 
lesser homicide.169  The defendant may not, however, be charged with felony 
murder.170 
 
 160. See DRESSLER, supra note 4, at 525. 
 161. See id. at 522. 
 162. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 565.021, 565.023, 558.011 (2000). 
 163. People v. Huter, 77 N.E. 6, 8 (N.Y. 1906); see also State v. Shock, 68 Mo. 
552, 561–62 (1878). 
 164. Huter, 77 N.E. at 8. 
 165. BINDER, supra note 5, at 4. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See MO. REV. STAT. § 565.021.1 (2000). 
 168. See id. § 565.023.1(1). 
 169. See id. § 565.024.1(1) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 170. Note, however, that certain crimes that may appear assaultive in nature do 
not merge with a homicide.  See DRESSLER, supra note 4, at 529.  For example, rape 
does not merge with a homicide if a killing occurs in the course of a rape.  See Buel v. 
People, 78 N.Y. 492, 497 (N.Y. 1879).  One who commits a rape commits a felony 
with a purpose other than physical injury or death.  See id.  Thus, if the victim dies 
during the course of the rape, the defendant may be charged with felony murder.  See 
id. at 499. 
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B.  Rules of Statutory Interpretation 
A series of related statutory provisions reside at the core of this issue.  
How a court interprets Section 565.021 defines the result.  Thus, rules of stat-
utory interpretation are a major factor in the analysis of the continued exist-
ence of the merger limitation in Missouri.  Two major rules influence how 
this statute should be interpreted, and each is fairly simple. 
The first rule was utilized by the Western District in Williams: expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius – “the mention of one thing implies the exclusion 
of another thing.”171  When a statute expressly mentions something, the omis-
sion of similar things is presumed intentional.172 Thus, if Missouri’s homicide 
provisions enumerate an assaultive felony as an underlying felony, the omis-
sion of other assaultive felonies should be presumed intentional. 
The second rule is that “[i]t is presumed that in the enactment of laws, 
the legislature does not intend to enact absurd laws.  Statutory construction is 
favored that avoids unjust or unreasonable results.”173  This rule serves an 
important purpose because it may assist in eliminating what is otherwise a 
valid interpretation of the statute.  The Supreme Court of Missouri has stated, 
“This Court is obligated to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the lan-
guage used and to give effect to that intent without arriving at an absurd re-
sult.  The law favors statutory construction that harmonizes with reason and 
that tends to avoid absurd results.”174  Ultimately, this rule will help divine 
the proper interpretation of whether the merger limitation continues to exist in 
Missouri. 
C.  The Western District’s Folly 
The Western District incorrectly held the merger limitation was abrogat-
ed by Sections 565.021.1(2) and 565.021.2.  In each case, Bouser175 and Wil-
liams,176 the court’s analysis failed in very different ways.  The Bouser 
court’s analysis was flawed because it failed to properly consider the contex-
tual reality in which the past cases, such as Shock, resided.177  The Williams 
court failed for an even more fundamental reason: its own rule of statutory 
interpretation works against its conclusions, and it failed to consider other 
 
 171. Kan. City v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 87 S.W.2d 195, 205 (Mo. 1935) 
(en banc). 
 172. See State v. Williams, 24 S.W.3d 101, 117 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). 
 173. David Ranken, Jr. Technical Inst. v. Boykins, 816 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Mo. 
1991) (en banc) (citation omitted), overruled by Alumax Foils, Inc. v. City of St. 
Louis, 939 S.W.2d 907, 911 (Mo. 1997) (en banc), as modified on denial of reh’g 
(Mar. 25, 1997). 
 174. Id. 
 175. State v. Bouser, 17 S.W.3d 130 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 
 176. State v. Williams, 24 S.W.3d 101 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). 
 177. Compare State v. Shock, 68 Mo. 552, 562 (1878), with Bouser, 17 S.W.3d at 
139. 
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relevant statutory provisions.  Both analyses fail because they create an ab-
surd result.  Because of these incorrect holdings, there is confusion in the law, 
and many criminal defendants now face uncertainty as to whether their 
crimes may serve as the underlying felony for felony murder. 
1.  Bouser’s Failure to Consider Historical Context 
The Western District in Bouser concluded the merger doctrine in Mis-
souri ceased to function because the modern felony murder statute stated that 
a defendant is guilty of second-degree murder if, during the commission or 
attempt of “any felony,” a person is killed as a result of that felony.178  But, 
the Bouser court failed to give due consideration to the historical and statuto-
ry contexts of the past cases discussing felony murder and the merger doc-
trine. 
In particular, Bouser directly attacked the applicability of State v. Shock 
to a modern understanding of felony murder.179  In doing so, it did not con-
sider the actual meaning of the case.  Instead, it merely sought to distinguish 
Shock into irrelevance.  Shock held that, under the felony murder statute in 
place at the time, “those acts of personal violence to the deceased which are 
necessary and constituent elements of the homicide itself” merge with the 
homicide.180 
Bouser asserted that the statutory interpretation that took place in Shock 
was inapplicable because the criminal act there did not constitute a felony in 
the first place and thus could not underlie a felony murder conviction.181  
According to Bouser, because modern statutes consider the criminal activity 
in Shock to be a felony, Shock’s analysis of whether the criminal assault 
could serve as an underlying felony is of no value.182  This reasoning is 
flawed.  Shock’s analysis of a merger limitation was not restricted to the sce-
nario at hand, which the Shock court recognized could not underlie felony 
murder because it was not a murder in the first place.183  Rather, Shock went 
beyond the circumstances and said that even if the crime did constitute a fel-
ony, it could not underlie a felony murder charge.184  Shock’s conclusions in 
this regard were based on an earlier case involving the misdemeanor man-
slaughter rule, where the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the misde-
meanor manslaughter statute: 
 
 178. Bouser, 17 S.W.3d at 139. 
 179. Id. at 136–37. 
 180. Shock, 68 Mo. at 561. 
 181. Bouser, 17 S.W.3d at 136. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Shock, 68 Mo. at 562.  Recall that Shock’s felony murder statute aggravated a 
killing that was second-degree murder to first-degree murder; it did not take any kill-
ing and convert it to murder.  Id. at 559. 
 184. Id. at 560. 
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[C]ontemplates some other misdemeanor than that which is an ingre-
dient in the imputed offense, otherwise that part of it relating to an at-
tempt to perpetrate a misdemeanor would be wholly nugatory; that 
where an act becomes criminal from the perpetration or the attempt to 
perpetrate some other crime, it would seem that the lesser could not be 
a part of the greater offense.185 
The Bouser court also attacked Shock because the statute at that time re-
quired that the killing be a murder – that is, that it be done with intent to 
kill.186  This is a trivial concern.  It is true that the statutory provisions 
evolved over time so that intent to kill was no longer a necessary aspect of 
felony murder.187  However, this modification did not change the plain lan-
guage of Shock’s holding that “those acts of personal violence to the deceased 
which are necessary and constituent elements of the homicide itself” merge 
with the homicide.188  This statement goes beyond the limitations the Bouser 
court set upon Shock’s applicability.  It is a clear merger limitation for all 
understandings of murder, not just first-degree murder. 
When Bouser began interpreting the legislature’s intent in writing the 
modern second-degree murder statute and its felony murder provision, it not-
ed that there was no mention of merger, nor were any specific felonies listed 
as valid underlying felonies.189  Thus, according to Bouser, when the felony 
murder provision mentioned the commission of “any felony,” it truly meant 
it.190  This argument forgets the historical context in which the statute was 
written.  It was written in a world where the merger doctrine existed in the 
courts.191  Further, and most importantly, it ignores a longstanding principle 
that legislatures are presumed to not pass laws that create an absurd, unrea-
sonable, or unjust result.192  The Bouser decision, if accurate, violates the 
most basic purpose of the merger limitation: it would permit the State to uti-
lize manslaughter as the underlying felony for felony murder.  Bouser’s ra-
tionale is clear: “any felony” literally means any felony.193  Thus, unlike Wil-
liams, the Bouser court opened the door to a form of felony murder that was 
noted as absurd by New York courts in 1838.  This result defies logic and 
cannot be correct.194 
 
 185. Id. at 563. 
 186. Bouser, 17 S.W.3d at 136. 
 187. Id. at 138. 
 188. Id. at 135 (quoting Shock, 68 Mo. at 561). 
 189. Id. at 138. 
 190. Id. at 139. 
 191. See supra Part II.B.  The statute was published in the 1986 edition of the 
Missouri Revised Statutes, and no court had yet claimed to overrule Shock.  See MO. 
REV. STAT. § 565.021 (1986). 
 192. See supra Part IV.B. 
 193. Bouser, 17 S.W.3d at 139. 
 194. See supra Part II.A. 
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 17
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss4/17
2015]  THE MISSOURI FELONY MURDER RULE’S MERGER LIMITATION1185 
2.  Mistaken Interpretation in Williams 
The Western District’s decision in Williams suffers two mistakes of in-
terpretation.  The first, and more prominent, is the same as that in Bouser.  By 
recognizing a limitation on felony murder only insofar as murder and man-
slaughter may not act as the underlying felonies, the statute permits the ab-
surd result that a person who commits an act constituting manslaughter may 
be charged with felony murder simply by citing the underlying offense as the 
felonious assault that led to the killing.195 
The second, subtler, mistake is that the Williams court failed to recog-
nize the statutory provision sitting directly in front of it.  Section 565.021.1(1) 
states: “A person commits the crime of murder in the second degree if he . . . 
[k]nowingly causes the death of another person or, with the purpose of caus-
ing serious physical injury to another person, causes the death of another 
person.”196  While this provision does not appear in the traditional felony 
murder provision, it nonetheless served the same purpose as felony murder: 
An unintended killing that results from an assault committed with the purpose 
of inflicting serious physical injury is second-degree murder.  It is, quite liter-
ally, an enumerated assaultive felony that may serve as the underlying felony 
for felony murder.197 
This fact is crucial to the analysis.  If the legislature intended for all fe-
lonious assaults to function as underlying felonies for felony murder, why did 
the legislature pass a second-degree murder statute that explicitly stated that a 
killing occurring from a felonious assault is second-degree murder?  The 
simplest answer is that it would do so only if it was aware of the merger limi-
tation on felony murder and desired to enumerate a specific type of felonious 
assault that would not merge. 
This does not, however, solve a prominent problem – if this assaultive 
felony does not merge, it may create the same absurd result that prosecutors 
may dodge manslaughter in favor of felony murder.  Most instances of man-
slaughter are the result of an individual attacking another person with the 
purpose of causing serious physical injury.  The legislature dealt with that 
before it ever became an issue.  Missouri Revised Statutes Section 
565.023.1(1), the voluntary manslaughter statute, establishes: 
A person commits the crime of voluntary manslaughter if he [c]auses 
the death of another person under circumstances that would constitute 
murder in the second degree under subdivision (1) of subsection 1 of 
section 565.021, except that he caused the death under the influence of 
sudden passion arising from adequate cause.198 
 
 195. See Bouser, 17 S.W.3d at 140; State v. Williams, 24 S.W.3d 101, 117 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2000). 
 196. MO. REV. STAT. §565.021.1(1) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 197. The described conduct is classified as assault in the first degree.  See id. § 
565.050. 
 198. Id. § 565.023.1(1). 
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Thus, the assaultive felony that does not merge, as per Section 
565.021.1(1), cannot be used to punish as murder a crime that is manslaugh-
ter, because the voluntary manslaughter statute expressly states that if the 
felonious assault and death occurs while the defendant is under the influence 
of sudden passion, the crime is manslaughter.199  Therefore, the legislature’s 
recognition of the validity of the merger doctrine was implicit in its construc-
tion of the second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter statutes.  This 
being the case, the Western District was plainly incorrect when it held in Wil-
liams that Section 565.021.2 abrogated the merger doctrine200 and when it 
said in State v. Gheen that “the merger doctrine, under the current Missouri 
statutory scheme, is no longer a viable theory.”201 
3.  Interpreting the Statutes 
The Missouri General Assembly intended to maintain the merger limita-
tion on felony murder.  The statutory language, and the construction of the 
provisions and how they relate to one another, proves it.  Section 565.021, the 
second-degree murder statute, states: 
1. A person commits the crime of murder in the second degree if he: 
(1) Knowingly causes the death of another person or, with the purpose 
of causing serious physical injury to another person, causes the death 
of another person; or 
(2) Commits or attempts to commit any felony, and, in the perpetra-
tion or the attempted perpetration of such felony or in the flight from 
the perpetration or attempted perpetration of such felony, another per-
son is killed as a result of the perpetration or attempted perpetration of 
such felony or immediate flight from the perpetration of such felony 
or attempted perpetration of such felony. 
2. Murder in the second degree is a class A felony, and the punishment 
for second degree murder shall be in addition to the punishment for 
commission of a related felony or attempted felony, other than murder 
or manslaughter.202 
It is incorrect to assume that felony murder only considers Section 
565.021.1(2).  True, it deals directly with the concept, but Section 
565.021.1(1) contains its own felony murder provision: it is second-degree 
murder if a person “causes the death of another person” while acting “with 
 
 199. See id. §§ 565.021.1(1), .023.1(1). 
 200. Williams, 24 S.W.3d at 117. 
 201. State v. Gheen, 41 S.W.3d 598, 605 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). 
 202. § 565.021.1–.2. 
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the purpose of causing serious physical injury” to that person.203  This is 
where another statute comes into play: assault in the first degree.204 
Section 565.021.1(1) provides an enumerated assaultive felony that may 
serve as an underlying felony for a conviction of second-degree murder.205  
By enumerating an assaultive felony, the Missouri General Assembly sig-
naled that the merger limitation was still valid in Missouri.  If it were not 
valid, this enumeration would be unnecessary because assault in the first de-
gree would fall within the meaning of Section 565.021.1(2).  Furthermore, 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies.  The inclusion of an enumerated 
assaultive felony precludes the use of others as predicate felonies for felony 
murder.206 
The evidence favoring this understanding is compounded by the fact 
that the Missouri legislature built in a method of preventing abuse of this 
enumerated felony.  Section 565.023, the voluntary manslaughter statute, 
states: 
1. A person commits the crime of voluntary manslaughter if he: 
(1) Causes the death of another person under circumstances that would 
constitute murder in the second degree under subdivision (1) of sub-
section 1 of section 565.021, except that he caused the death under the 
influence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause[.]207 
Section 565.023.1(1) prevents the State from using assault in the first 
degree as an end-around voluntary manslaughter.208  Normally, an assaultive 
felony as a predicate felony for felony murder would allow the prosecutor to 
evade manslaughter – if the act was manslaughter – by charging felony mur-
der and utilizing the assault as an underlying felony.  Assault in the first de-
gree may be an enumerated felony for the purposes of felony murder, but 
even it is limited by statute.  If a death occurs following an individual com-
mitting assault in the first degree, and that assault was preceded by the influ-
ence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause, the defendant should be 
convicted of voluntary manslaughter, not second-degree murder – i.e. felony 
murder. 
This interpretation of the statute solves every problem created by the 
Western District’s holdings in Bouser and Williams.  It gives full considera-
tion to all relevant statutory provisions.  It recognizes the legislature’s intent 
 
 203. Id. § 565.021.1(1). 
 204. Id. § 565.050.1. 
 205. See id. § 565.021.1(1).  Recall that felony murder is not its own crime in 
Missouri, but a concept of culpability under second-degree murder.  Id. § 
565.021.1(2). 
 206. See Kan. City v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 87 S.W.2d 195, 205 (Mo. 
1935); see also § 565.021.1(1). 
 207. § 565.023.1(1). 
 208. See id. 
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to cut a single hole in the merger limitation.  It reconciles the rest of the felo-
ny murder rule with the merger limitation.  And, most importantly, it elimi-
nates the absurd result created by both Bouser and Williams: the obliteration 
of homicide gradations. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Missouri should end its silence on this issue.  
One hundred thirty-seven years since effectively weighing in on the issue of 
the merger doctrine’s validity in State v. Shock is long enough.209  Until the 
Supreme Court of Missouri weighs in, the law will remain uncertain.210  This 
uncertainty cannot be allowed to continue. 
The Western District’s holdings cannot be allowed to stand.  Its ra-
tionale in approaching the statute failed to recognize the clear flaw that arises 
when only manslaughter and murder are precluded from serving as underly-
ing felonies.  Its holdings lead only to dangerous and absurd results: an as-
sault that leads to a death – even if committed in the heat of passion – may 
serve as the underlying felony of a felony murder conviction.  The killing 
may meet the definition of manslaughter, or even a lesser degree of homicide, 
but may nonetheless be punished as second-degree murder.  This is a perver-
sion of the justice system. 
Furthermore, the Western District’s interpretation was plainly wrong.  
The Western District failed to recognize that Section 565.021.1(1) enumer-
ates an assaultive felony as serving the role of an underlying felony.  There 
would be no reason for such an enumeration if the legislature intended for 
truly any felony to function as an underlying felony.  Thus, this enumeration 
reflects the legislature’s belief that the merger limitation still applied to some 
felonies.  Additionally, the voluntary manslaughter statute, Section 565.023, 
precludes this enumerated assaultive felony from creating the absurd result 
that the assault could serve as an underlying felony, even when the killing 
was itself manslaughter. 
Because we assume that legislatures do not intend their legislation to 
have an irrational result, and the Western District’s interpretation leads to an 
irrational result, its interpretation cannot be correct.  Rather, the correct inter-
pretation of the second-degree murder statute maintains the merger doctrine.  
It does so because the statute enumerates an assaultive felony that may under-
lie felony murder, and the legislature wrote the voluntary manslaughter stat-





 209. 68 Mo. 552 (1878). 
 210. BINDER, supra note 5, at 238. 
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